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* Uti possidetis (Latin) means "as you possess, so may you continue to possess." The term currently
refers to "the doctrine that colonial administrative boundaries will become international boundaries when a
political subdivision or colony achieves independence." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1582 (8th ed. 2001).
However, under Roman law it was an interdict ordering the parties to maintain possession of property until it
was determined who owned the property. Because the United States may consider the possibility of acquiring
new territory, should it also seek possession as support for acquisition? If it does possess and acquire territory,
what are the rights of those individuals previously located in the territory? These questions are considered in
this article.
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Whatever [the federal government] acquires, it acquires for the benefit
of the people of the several states who created it. It is their trustee acting
for them, and charged with the duty of promoting the interests of the
whole people of the Union in the exercise of the powers specifically
granted.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States began as a small union of thirteen colonies that joined
together to become part of a federal republic. Since that time, the United States
has grown to encompass fifty states and a handful of territories. The citizens of
the several states have been taught from an early age that the Constitution is the
supreme law of our land and that it offers protections from our federal and state
governments. We are taught that we are guaranteed to be free from unjust
governments through our power to elect the people who govern us and that we
are guaranteed a variety of personal rights and freedoms as set forth in the Bill of
Rights and other constitutional provisions.
The residents of United States territories, however, may not accept these
teachings as readily. Depending on the method by which a territory was acquired
by the United States, citizens may not be granted any of the rights outlined
above. An important question that arises is whether the inhabitants of United
States territories actually have "rights" or simply revocable benefits disguised as
such.
The purpose of this article is to identify the historical rationale for the United
States' acquisition of territory and to analyze the legal authority (or lack thereof)
available to Congress and the executive branch to acquire territory. Of supreme
importance in any study of the acquisition of territory are the rights of inhabitants
of the territories as well as the rights of Congress under the Constitution and
important court rulings; these topics are discussed below. Finally, this article
considers the reasons the United States may wish to acquire more territory in the
future and how that desire comports with our role as international citizens.
1. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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II. RATIONALES FOR PAST ACQUISITIONS
Perhaps more important than the question of how the United States can
legally acquire territory is the question of why the United States would want to
acquire territory. In many cases, there is little or no benefit to acquiring territory.
This section provides an overview of the acquisition of past and present United
States territories, offers insights into why land was acquired, and suggests
potential reasons why the United States may want to acquire territory in the
future.2
Although the reasons for past and present acquisitions vary greatly, some
broad rationales for acquisitions obviously recur within the discussion. Many of
the acquisitions related in some way to military action. For instance, some
acquisitions came as a result of military victories over the holders of the land.
Some acquisitions were made because the United States perceived that it was
necessary to place military bases in the territory for security reasons. Similarly,
many of the acquisitions were accomplished for economic reasons. One of the
most notable economic reasons for acquisition was to facilitate access by United
States developers to the natural resources in the area. Finally, acquisition appears
to have been made to satisfy the citizens' desire to expand the boundaries of the
nation and to permit the nation to fulfill its "Manifest Destiny."3
A. The Louisiana Purchase
The Louisiana Purchase covered a vast amount of territory. The first
European power to lay claim to that land was France. France also possessed
holdings in Canada. After the Seven Years' War (French and Indian War),
France lost its Canadian holdings. As a result, the administrative costs of
maintaining its North American colony quickly outstripped any benefits that the
colony may have provided as a trade route to France's Canadian holdings. As a
2. One of the most historically important acquisitions of territory by the United States federal
government was executed in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. This acquisition brought the first federally
acquired land. I do not include a discussion of the Northwest Ordinance because in 1787 the Constitution of the
United States, as we know it, had not been adopted. The federal Convention was hard at work drafting the
document when the Northwest Ordinance was enacted by the Continental Congress in New York. For more on
this and an in-depth look at the constitutional aspects of the Northwest Ordinance, see generally Dennis P.
Duffey, The Northwest Ordinance as a Constitutional Document, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 929 (1995).
3. John L. O'Sullivan, The Great Nation of Futurity, 6 U.S. DEMOCRATIC REV. 426 (1839). O'Sullivan
coined the phrase, but it was used primarily by
politicians in the 1840s to explain continental expansion by the United States .... The people of the
United States felt it was their mission to extend the 'boundaries of freedom' to others by imparting
their idealism and belief in democratic institutions to those who were capable of self-government. It
excluded those people who were perceived as being incapable of self-government, such as Native
American people and those of non-European origin.
PBS.org, Manifest Destiny, http://www.pbs.org/kera/usmexicanwar/prelude/mdintroduction.html (last visited
May 6, 2007) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
4. PETER J. KASTOR, THE NATION'S CRUCIBLE: THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE CREATION OF
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solution, France ceded all of its holdings west of the Mississippi River to Spain.
Spain, in turn, ceded its West Florida territory to England, which had "won" the
Seven Years' War.'
In the meantime, Americans had begun to travel westward. Settlers and
entrepreneurs needed to be sure that they had access to a waterway to transport
their goods. The United States began to look toward the idea of acquiring the
Louisiana territory. The United States negotiated a "right of deposit" with the
Spanish in the Treaty of San Lorenzo of 1796, whereby Americans could use the
river and deposit goods at no charge from Spain. Americans were surprised to
find that, one day, they no longer had the right to deposit: The Spanish had
actually secretly re-ceded the Louisiana territory back to France.'
The initial purpose for acquiring this territory was to appease traders and
settlers who wanted to be assured that they could transport goods from the
frontier to civilization However, the Louisiana Purchase actually doubled the
size of the United States. American negotiators purchased all of the French
holdings in what is now the Continental United States, which included all or
some of Louisiana, Arkansas, Missouri, Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, South
Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, Colorado, Wyoming, and Montana
Clearly, that much territory was not necessary to access the Mississippi River and
take advantage of the Port of New Orleans. Perhaps the Americans did not want
to risk any more trouble with the other European nations. Maybe, by the turn of
the century, they were ready to explore even further into the frontier.9 The means
that the United States used to acquire the Louisiana Territory are more closely
examined later in this article.'
B. Alaska
A half century later, Congress again used its power to purchase territory
when it acquired Alaska from Russia for $7.2 million. Russia was facing
financial difficulties and saw the sale as a source of revenue. The United States
was seen as a potential buyer because the United States Secretary of State,
William Seward, was known to have an expansive vision of how far the
American empire should extend. The Russian minister may have believed that he
got the better end of the bargain, having convinced Seward that the purchase was
AMERICA 26 (2004).
5. Id. Spain retook that territory by force shortly thereafter.
6. GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRES 18-20 (2004). In the Treaty of
Idelfonso between Spain and France, Spain agreed to return the territory to France if France would name a
Spanish Prince as King of Tuscany. Spain maintained administrative control and denied ever having assumed
ownership. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 20.
9. THE READER'S COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY (Eric Foner & John A. Garraty eds., 1990).
10. See infra Part M.
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beneficial to the United States and actually succeeding in procuring an additional
$2.2 million above Seward's initial offer." Seward's Folly," as Alaska came to
be known, has proven to be one of the best investments the United States has
ever made, generating large amounts of gold and petroleum.'3
C. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo: Texas
By the mid 1800s, Americans wanted to expand even further into the western
portion of the continent. The concept of Manifest Destiny had certainly gained in
popularity.1
4
In the first half of the nineteenth century, the land that is now named Texas
belonged to Mexico. Nonetheless, Anglos began to settle thickly in the area. By
the 1830s, there were only an estimated 4000 Mexicans remaining in Texas, as
compared with the 25,000 Anglos. 5 In 1845, the United States annexed Texas
without the permission of Mexico. Angered, Mexico ceased relations with the
United States.' 6 The United States then attempted to purchase additional land
from Mexico in what is now the Southwestern United States. Mexico refused. In
1846, the tensions served as a basis for war after a dispute between Mexican and
American border officials. War was declared, and the United States defeated
Mexico. 7 The Mexican American War ended in 1848 when both countries signed
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. In relevant part, the document ceded about half
of Mexico's territory to the United States.'" The territory acquired by the United
States included not only Texas but also what would become the states of
California, Nevada, Utah, most of New Mexico and Arizona, and parts of
Colorado and Wyoming.'9
11. Baron Stoecki was the Russian Minister to the United States. He worked closely with Secretary
Seward on the deal. William H. Seward, The Promise of Alaska, Essential Documents in American History,
1492-Present (on file with author).
12. Other not-so-affectionate nicknames for Alaska included "Seward's Ice Box" and "President
Andrew Johnson's Polar Bear Garden" because many people believed it was ridiculous to spend money on such
a remote outpost. Id.
13. See generally Marilyn J. Ward Ford, Twenty Five Years of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act:
Self Determination or Destruction of the Heritage, Culture, and Way of Life of Alaska's Native Americans?, 12
J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 305, 317 (1997).
14. See supra note 3 for a discussion of the concept of Manifest Destiny.
15. David Kim Chanbonpin, How the Border Crossed Us: Filling the Gap Between Plume v. Seward
and the Dispossession of Mexican Landowners in California After 1848, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 297, 303 (2005).
16. Id. Chanbonpin's article offers a compelling look at how property law, as seen in Plume v. Seward,
4 Cal. 94 (1854), is as much the result of Anglo American racism as common law theory. Id. at 298.
17. Id. at 304.
18. Id. Although this acquisition seems far more straightforward than the Louisiana Purchase, the Texas
acquisition is actually fraught with constitutional problems. Part III will address these problems thoroughly, but
in relevant part the United States is not authorized to declare war for the purpose of acquiring territory. There
seems to be little support for any other motivation for war in this case.
19. Library of Congress, Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Primary Documents in American History,
http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/Guadalupe.html (last visited May 6, 2007) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
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D. Oregon
In Texas, the United States annexed territory in which United States citizens
had settled. The United States made a similar claim to Oregon. United States
citizens had long resided in parts of Oregon, particularly the Willamette Valley.
The Oregon settlers had established their own government and many people had
expected the Oregon territory to evolve into its own republic. 0
England also had established settlements in the Northwestern portion of the
continent. The United States, in the course of negotiations with England, lay
claim to title under the doctrine of discovery, which has had a profound impact
on Native Americans and their territories. 2  The United States asserted that
because its citizens had settled in Oregon first, the United States had discovered
the territory. This argument naturally raises several questions, including whether
the actions of private citizens are enough to establish "discovery" for the
purposes of territorial sovereignty.
The settlers who lived in Oregon had repeatedly asked Congress to pass
legislation regarding the territory. Because of the vastness of the territory, it was
difficult for the United States and England to establish the boundaries. Although
the United States never said that it did not have the best title to the Oregon
territory, Congress passed no legislation regarding Oregon until the United States
and Britain signed the Oregon Treaty in 1846. The boundary line that resulted
from this treaty is the now familiar forty-ninth parallel that separates the United
States from Canada.22
The reasons for the United States' acquisition of Oregon are many and
reasonable. To begin with, many American residents already lived there. The
settlers were of the same general race, religion, and culture as the rest of the
United States. When coupled with the theory of Manifest Destiny, American
acquisition of the Oregon territory was inevitable.23
20. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 6, at 94-95.
21. The problems inherent in the discovery doctrine, such as the fact that there were already civilizations of
people living in the territory at hand, may be clear to everyone today. In 1848, however, Anglos and other Christian
Europeans did not accept the Native Americans as a real civilization. See LINDSAY G. ROBERTSON, CONQUEST BY
LAW: HOW THE DISCOVERY OF AMERICA DISPOSSESSED INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF THEIR LANDS xiii (2005).
[Tihere has been an occasional tendency in the historiography of Anglo-indigenous relations during the
early republican period to characterize federal policy as consistently knowingly duplicitous. Without
intending to suggest that this was never true, I do not believe [Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543,
589 (1823)] fits this model. Instead, I think the opinion offers an instructive picture of how intelligent
people can sometimes unthinkingly create catastrophic problems they find themselves powerless to fix.
Id. Robertson notes that in writing the Johnson opinion, which introduced the discovery doctrine, Justice Marshall was
concerned not only with the disposition of the case but with a number of other issues, including the power of the
Supreme Court. Id. at 77. Robertson further observes that in 1832 when Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832),
came before the Court Marshall "repudiated the discovery doctrine, but by then it was too late. Marshall's death in
1835 and the filling of the Court with Andrew Jackson's appointees prevented the securing of this repudiation ... " Id.
at xii.
22. LAWSON& SEIDMAN, supra note 6, at 94-95.
23. O'Sullivan, supra note 3.
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E. Guano Islands
Another set of acquisitions that has not factored greatly in our concept of
what constitutes the United States but nonetheless sets forth an important reason
to acquire territory involves the Guano Islands. The Guano Islands were first
exploited by American developers who discovered that the volcanic islands were
piled high with guano, a nutrient-rich fertilizer that is in fact bird droppings. 2
Recognizing the potential for profit, the United States passed the Guano Islands
Act of 1856, which laid claim to all islands containing the guano that had been
and would be "discovered" by American developers, and further stated that there
was no obligation on the part of the United States to continue to maintain the
islands after the guano deposits had been depleted 5
F. The Treaty of Peace of 1898: Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippine Islands
The United States declared war on Spain in 1898. The stated reason for the
United States action was to secure independence for Cuba. The United States
forces occupied Cuba and Puerto Rico and then defeated Spanish forces in
Manila, the Philippines. As a result of the Treaty of Peace of 1898, the United
States acquired Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippine Islands 6
This acquisition was different from all previous acquisitions because there
were no United States settlers in these areas. Additionally, there was no intent on
the part of Americans to settle in any of these places. The islands were
geographically remote, and the native peoples were of a different culture and
27
spoke other languages. Acquisition of these territories did, nonetheless, serve a
purpose. These territories could serve as strategic military outposts. They were
21convenient stops for the United States military on long voyages.
24. OFF. OF THE GEN. COUN., U.S. GEN. AccT. OFF., 1997 U.S. INSULAR AREAS: APPLICATION OF THE
U.S. CONSTITUTION: REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON RESOURCES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
GAO/OGC-98-5, available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/I998/og98005.pdf (last visited May 6, 2007) (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
25. Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth
Century Origins of Plenary Power Over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEx. L. REV. 1, 203 (2002). The abandonment
provision of the Guano Islands Act of 1856, codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1419, provides "[n]othing in this [chapter]
contained shall be construed as obligating the United States to retain possession of the islands, rocks, or keys,
after the guano shall have been removed from the same."
26. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 6, at 111.
27. Id.
28. Also not discussed in great detail here is the fact that United States chose to purchase the Virgin
Islands from Denmark in 1917 to control entry into the Gulf of Mexico. The Virgin Islands stand apart as the
only territory the United States purchased that has not become a state. American Samoa, on the other hand, was
acquired when the United States, Germany, and England reached an agreement regarding their spheres of
influence. The native chiefs of American Samoa also ceded their territory to the United States, making that
particular acquisition less troublesome than many. Id. at 115-17.
2007/Is Possession Really Nine-Tenths of the Law?
G. Hawaii
Like the Guano Islands, the Hawaiian Islands initially attracted a group of
American investors. In 1856, King Kamehameha III considered a proposal of
annexation of Hawaii to the United States. When he died, the matter had not been
resolved.29 In 1892, United States landowners, many of whom were sugar
industry investors, were concerned about import tariffs and formed a group to
advocate annexation. Eventually, the American bureaucrats and investors
convinced the United States to take Hawaii by force.0 In addition to providing
rich natural resources and the ideal climate to grow tropical produce, the
Hawaiian Islands became important to the United States military in the periods
before and during World War II.
H. Panama Canal
After the Spanish-American War, the United States was a power in both the
Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean. As a result, the United States saw the
military advantage of a canal that, when needed, would allow a quick transfer of
warships "from one ocean to the other."'" Additionally, the commercial
advantages of a canal that could be used for sea trade were well recognized."
In 1903, Panama was a northern province of Colombia. When the Columbian
Legislature failed to ratify a treaty giving the United States the right to build and
manage a canal across Panama, Panamanians with the support of the United
States Marines began a rebellion and declared Panamanian independence. The
31United States immediately recognized the new country. Under the terms of a
treaty with Panama, effective February 26, 1904, and in return for a substantial
investment and annual fees, the United States was granted a perpetual lease to a
strip of land across the Isthmus of Panama to connect the Atlantic and the Pacific
Oceans.34
29. Michael M. McPherson, Trustees of Hawaiian Affairs v. Yamasaki and the Native Hawaiian Claim:
Too Much of Nothing, 21 ENVTL. L. 453,458,462 (1991).
30. This situation is almost the reverse of that in the Guano islands where the United States intervened to
protect American developers. Here, United States developers were actually able to mobilize the support of
United States diplomats and the Navy. In fact, President Cleveland's Commission determined that United States
diplomats and investors were responsible for Queen Lili'uokalani's ouster. JAMES BLOUNT, REPORT OF
COMMISSION TO THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, EXEC. Doc. 47 (2d. Sess. 1893).
31. BUREAU OF INT'L INFO., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PROGRAMS, GROWTH AND TRANSFORMATION, AN
OUTLINE OF AMERICAN HISTORY 184, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/histryotln/index.htm
(last visited May 6, 2007) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.; see also OFFICE OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL 7
app. A4 [hereinafter FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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L American Samoa
While Samoan raw materials did not draw the economic interest that Hawaii
did, it had strong potential as a naval base.35 Nevertheless, the United States was
not the only interested party. In 1878, the United States signed a treaty of
commerce and friendship with the Samoan King Malietoa to obtain rights to
build a harbor at Pago-Pago. Germany obtained harbor rights and an exemption
from import duties in Samoa by treaty in 1879. That same year, Britain also
signed a treaty obtaining harbor rights. 6 Tensions over Samoa continued until
Great Britain and Germany ceded American Samoa to the United States as part
of the Tripartite Convention.37
On March 4, 1925, by joint resolution, the United States Congress extended
American Samoa by making Swains Island an administrative part of American
Samoa and proclaiming United States sovereignty over the island, which had
been claimed as a private possession by the Jennings family. The Joint
Resolution stated that Swains Island was "included in the list of guano islands
appertaining to the United States, which have been bonded under the Act of
Congress approved August 18, 1856."" 9 Despite its listing as a guano island, the
report accompanying the resolution noted that the status of Swains Island was
complicated by "the fact that no guano has, at least for some years, been removed
from the island;" however, the report also noted that Great Britain, the only other
country with a potential claim, had recognized United States jurisdiction."
J. Virgin Islands of the United States
Like American Samoa, the appeal of the Virgin Islands to the United States
was based, not on economics, but on its strategic military location.4' Due to the
potential military benefits offered by the islands' location, the United States, as
35. Lise Namikas, Samoa and U.S. Empire, 10 PEACE REV. 375,375 (1998).
36. Id.
37. FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, supra, note 34. The ratification of the Tripartite Convention on
February 16, 1900, is recorded at 31 Stat. 1878 (1900).
38. OFFICE OF INSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, A BRIEF HISTORY OF SWAINS ISLAND IN
AMERICAN SAMOA, http://www.doi.gov/oia/Islandpages/swainsis.htm (last visited May 6, 2007) (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review) (noting that the Jennings family has held title to all or part of Swains Island since
1856).
39. Joint Resolution Extending the sovereignty of the United States over Swains Island and making the
island a part of American Samoa, 68 Pub. Res. 75; 43 Stat. 1357 (1925).
40. H.R. REP. NO. 68-1549, at 3 (1925).
41. Sugarcane was the main economic crop of the Virgin Islands during the seventeenth century.
Because slave labor produced the sugarcane, the islands were in economic decline after slavery was abolished
in 1848. Despite this economic decline, the United States desired to acquire the islands for security reasons.
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Virgin Islands, CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/cialpublications/
factbook/ (last visited May 6, 2007) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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early as 1865, had expressed an interest in acquiring the islands.4 '2 During World
War I, fear that Germany might occupy the islands provided an additional
impetus for the United States to purchase the islands from Denmark. Pursuant to
a treaty ratified on January 17, 1917, The United States purchased the islands,
formerly the Danish West Indies.4 '3 The islands were placed under the control of
the Department of the Navy until February 27, 1931, when an executive order
placed them under the supervision of the Department of the Interior."
K. The Trust Territories
After World War II, the United Nations was concerned that many of the
territories that had been governed by Axis powers were unable to govern
themselves. As a result, the United Nations established strategic trusts, which
allowed the territories to operate under the protection of the United States and
other allied countries."
As the trusteeship agreement was terminated, the United States developed
differing relationships with the areas within the former Pacific Islands Trust
Territory. However, United States interest in the areas was often similar. As
expressed by the principal United States representative in negotiations regarding
the future status of the trust territory, the key United States interest was ensuring
military basing privileges so that third parties could not put the area to use for
military-related purposes and so that the United States could fulfill its security
responsibilities in the Pacific. 6
Despite the similar United States interest, the various areas within the trust
territory foresaw differing relationships. Some desired a "looser, more
autonomous relationship of 'free association,"' while the Northern Mariana
Islands desired a "closer and more permanent political relationship with the
United States." 7 Under the Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States, the Northern
Marianas became a "self-governing Commonwealth," that is "in political union
with and under the sovereignty of the United States of America. 4 8
42. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PUERTO RICO AND THE OUTLYING AREAS: GEOGRAPHIC AREAS REFERENCE
MANUAL 7-38 (2005).
43. FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, supra note 34.
44. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 42. Despite Department of Interior administration, the Virgin
Islanders have participated in the election of a governor since 1970 and been represented by a nonvoting
delegate to the United States House of Representatives since 1973. Id.
45. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 6, at 117.
46. Roger S. Clark, Self Determination and Free Association - Should the United Nations Terminate the
Pacific Island Trust?, 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1,4 (1980) (citing OFFICE OF MICRONESIAN STATUS NEGOTIATIONS,
THE FUTURE POLITICAL STATUS OF THE TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS (Official Records of the
Fourth Round of Micronesian Status Negotiations, Koror, Palau, Apr. 2-13, 1972)).
47. N. Mariana Islands v. United States, No. Civ. A. 99-0028, 2003 WL 22997235 at *2 (D. N. Mar. I.
Aug 7, 2003).
48. Pub. L. No. 94-241, 90 Stat. 263, at 264 (1976).
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III. ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY
There is certainly no power given by the Constitution to the Federal
Government to establish or maintain colonies bordering on the United
States or at a distance, to be ruled and governed at its own pleasure; nor
to enlarge its territorial limits in any way, except by the admission of
new States.49
The Constitution provides no direct grant of power to acquire territory.
Indeed, the Constitution is silent on the issue. 0 Judicial opinions, such as Downes
v. Bidwell and Scott v. Sandford, discussed below, have struggled to define the
constitutional grant of power to acquire territory beyond the original thirteen
states. This indirect grant of power to acquire territory has been the subject of
judicial interpretation for most of the history of our nation.
A. Purchase
The proposed annexation of the Louisiana Territory sparked the first serious
discussion of how to acquire territory. Two issues were the source of heated
debate. One issue was the source of governmental power to acquire territory. The
second, and perhaps more fundamental question, was whether such power
existed. "'
History seems to provide support for the sentiment that the United States
must carefully exercise any power it might have to acquire territory. President
Thomas Jefferson, among others, was concerned that the United States might
follow the footsteps of the European nations and colonize other countries as a
49. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 446 (1857).
50. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 249 (1901). Justice Brown quotes Thomas Jefferson to
exemplify the fundamental Constitutional problem of territorial acquisition faced by the government for the first
time when the United States sought to purchase Louisiana from France. Mr. Jefferson stated:
I suppose [Congress] must then appeal to the nation for an additional article to the Constitution
approving and confirming an act which the nation had not previously authorized. The Constitution
has made no provision for holding foreign territory, still less for incorporating foreign nations into
our Union. The Executive, in seizing the fugitive occurrence which so much advances the good of
their country, has done an act beyond the Constitution.
Id. at 253. Mr. Jefferson prepared two amendments to the Constitution to incorporate Louisiana into the Union
and to confer citizenship upon its white inhabitants, but he later gave the entire problem over to Congress,
which ultimately found that the treaty power gave the United States the right to acquire territory.
51. Authors Lawson and Seidman provide fascinating insight into the constitutionality of the acquisition
of power. According to them, the power to acquire land through treaty, as with the power to acquire by war and
the "sweeping" power, is a strictly implementational power. Thus, any of those powers may be invoked, but on
the condition that they are invoked to carry out an enumerated power duty, for example, to admit states, to
provide military bases, etc. The authors use this two-part test to legitimize almost all acquisitions of land made
by the United States because almost all of the acquired territories were either admitted as states or made useful
as military outposts. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 6, at 17-77.
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means of acquisition . 2 Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court declared
that war could not legally be waged for the purposes of acquiring territory, nor
could the President control an enemy's territory." The Supreme Court, however,
left Congress with other means through which it might legally acquire territory.
The Supreme Court first stated its rationale for territorial acquisition in
Johnson v. M'Intosh.14 This rationale was refined in an 1828 decision concerning
federal jurisdiction in the Florida territory in which Chief Justice John Marshall
concluded that the power to acquire territory comes from the powers of making
war and making treaties in Article I of the Constitution. 5 The Court reasoned that
conquering territory as part of a military occupation is sometimes necessary in
war but, when the war is over, the conquered territory must either be ceded back
to the nation from which it came or become part of the nation that conquered the
territory. The territory must be ruled according to the terms of the treaty that led
to its acquisition or on such terms as "its new master shall impose. ' 56
In two early instances of territory acquisition, including the purchases of
Louisiana from France and Florida from Spain, the fates of the territories and
their inhabitants were part of the treaty, or, more likely, the contract for
consideration the rulers reached. In its agreement with France, the United States
agreed that the territory it would acquire would be incorporated into the rest of
the United States and admitted to the Union as soon as possible. The United
States also agreed to protect certain civil rights enjoyed by the people of
Louisiana until such time as they were officially admitted to the Union.57 The
Supreme Court, concerned that although Congress's power to acquire territory
arose from its treaty-making power, there was no requirement that such acquired
52. ARNOLD H. LEIBOWlTZ, DEFINING STATUS: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF U.S. TERRITORIAL
RELATIONS 12 (1989).
53. Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. 603, 614 (1850).
54. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 589 (1823). The Court stated:
The title by conquest is acquired and maintained by force. The conqueror prescribes its limits.
Humanity, however, acting on public opinion, has established, as a general rule, that the conquered
shall not be wantonly oppressed, and that their condition shall remain as eligible as is compatible
with the objects of the conquest. Most usually, they are incorporated with the victorious nation, and
become subjects or citizens of the government with which they are connected.
Id.
55. Article I, section 8, clause 11 grants Congress the power to declare war and make rules on the
capture of land and water. Article 11, section 2, clause 2 gives the President the power to make treaties provided
that two-thirds of the senators who are present to vote concur.
56. Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton (Canter), 511,511 (1828).
57. Article III of the treaty states:
The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States, and
admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the Federal Constitution, to the
enjoyment of all rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States; and in the
meantime they shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and
the religion which they profess.
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244,324-25 (1901).
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territory immediately become a state, held that the territory must eventually
become a state.58
B. Westward Expansion
In spite of the fact that the Constitution is silent on territorial acquisition, the
Constitution does provide for the incorporation of states into the Union. 9 The
interpretation of the war and treaty-making powers to include the right to acquire
territory has resulted in the expansion of the Union from the original thirteen
colonies to fifty states. The travels of Lewis and Clark, along with other
influences, gave the country a vision of its Manifest Destiny. 6° Despite the
misgivings expressed by the Founding Fathers, including Thomas Jefferson, that
colonial expansion might cause undesirable consequences, the United States
expanded westward to the Pacific Ocean and as far south as the Rio Grande.6'
The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 set forth the Founding Fathers' image that
territorial acquisition would eventually lead to statehood.62 Congress considered
several criteria in determining when and if a territory ought to be incorporated as
a state: 1) an inclination of the populace toward the principles of democracy; 2)
an expressed desire by a majority of the territory's citizens to become a state; and
3) a determination that the proposed state had sufficient resources so that it could
provide its share of costs to the federal government."
C. Conquest
The limitations the Supreme Court prescribed in regard to land acquired by
conquest seemed to disappear by the time the Treaty of 1898 was signed. The
Treaty of 1898 was an agreement designed to end the war between Spain and the
United States. The Supreme Court, which held that territories acquired by the
United States government must inevitably be incorporated into the Union as
states, extracted the principle from the treaty documents and not the
Constitution. 64 Neither statehood nor the rights of citizenship were granted to the
people of the Philippines and Guam in the Treaty of 1898. Rather, their civil
58. Id.
59. Article IV, section 3, clause 1 allows for the admittance of new states to the Union, but prohibits the
formation of states within an existing state.
60. For an in-depth discussion of Lewis and Clark expeditions, and the circumstances surrounding
western expansion, see generally STEPHEN A. AMBROSE, UNDAUNTED COURAGE: MERIWETHER LEWIS,
THOMAS JEFFERSON, AND THE OPENING OF THE AMERICAN WEST, chs. 4-5 (1996).
61. Interestingly, Ambrose wrote of Jefferson, "[iun the age of imperialism, he was the greatest empire
builder of all. His mind encompassed the continent. From the beginning of the revolution, he thought of the
United States as a nation stretching from sea to sea. More than any other man, he made that happen." Id. at 56.
62. LEIBOWITZ, supra note 52, at 6.
63. Id. at 70.
64. Id.
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rights were restricted to those rights Congress chose to grant, and their status,
present and future, was not ascertainable.
Even in the modern era, native inhabitants of United States territories linked
to the mainland through neither kin nor culture have complained of their status.
In the early 1990s, for example, former Governor Ada of Guam pleaded with
Washington, D.C. in at least two impassioned speeches. In the first, he
emphasized to Congress that, "[e]ven today, we do not have rights, only
benefits. 66 Later, he spoke more harshly, stating, "Guam is a colony of America,
with all that the term implies. We are a colony, one of the last, in a world which
for the most part has turned away from the idea that colonies should exist., 67 It
seems clear that these are the problems that will arise when a territory is held for
nearly one hundred years with no promise of either statehood or independence.
Perhaps Thomas Jefferson's anticipation of these types of problems were what
led him to express concern regarding the Louisiana Purchase.
IV. CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO GOVERN TERRITORIES
[T]he United States has the power to acquire territory as a necessary
and proper adjunct of sovereignty and of the power to declare and carry
68
on war and to make treaties.
Because the courts and Congress have taken the constitutional war and treaty
clauses to mean that the United States may acquire territory, the issue then arises
of how a territory is to be governed.
A. Constitutional Grants of Power
The Constitution speaks on the issue of governance of territories in only one
clause. It grants Congress the "power to dispose of and make all needful Rules
65. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 339-40 (1901). Article IX of the Treaty of 1898 reads:
Spanish subjects, natives of the peninsula residing in the territory over which Spain by the present
treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty, may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom,
retaining in either event all rights of property or of its proceeds; and they shall have the right to carry
on their industry, commerce, and professions, being subject in such respect to such laws as are
applicable to other foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance
to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from the date of the
exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in
default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the
nationality of the territory in which they may reside. The civil rights and political status of the native
inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by Congress.
Id.
66. Jeremiah O'Leary, Guam's Status Yearning, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1990, at G3.
67. William Claibome, Guam Seeks Upgrade in Status, Residents Threaten Independence Action,
WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 1993, at AI4.
68. Cabebe v. Acheson, 183 F.2d 795, 800 (9th Cir. 1950).
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and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States." 69 Because the first territories were acquired after the founding of
the Union, the Supreme Court has been asked to decide the limits of
congressional power over the territories. Once the country moved past its
"Manifest Destiny" borders, difficulties arose in determining how to apply the
Constitution to the new territories.
From debates leading up to the addition of the Territories Clause, it can be
inferred that the Founding Fathers did not contemplate the expansion of the
Union beyond the territory already possessed.7° Even then, it was anticipated that
this territory would eventually become a state or states.7' As the federal
government acquired more territory, however, it became increasingly difficult for
Congress and the Supreme Court to decide how the territories should be
governed. Should the Constitution apply uniformly to the territories and states?
In one of the first cases delineating the applicability of the Constitution to
non-states, Loughborough v. Blake,72 Justice Marshall concluded that Article I,
section 8 of the Constitution should apply with equal force in the District of
Columbia as it does to the states. Justice Marshall concluded that because the
Constitution, and not Congress, was supreme, the Constitution applied without
limitation to wherever the government extends. His ruling included territories:
Does this term [Article I, section 8] designate the whole, or any
particular portion of the American empire? Certainly this question can
admit of but one answer. It is the name given to our great republic, which
is composed of States and territories. The district of Columbia, or the
territory west of the Missouri, is not less within the United States, than
Maryland or Pennsylvania; and it is not less necessary, on the principles
of our constitution, that uniformity in the imposition of imposts, duties
and excises, should be observed in the one, than in the other.73
While it would appear that this opinion would be sufficient to settle the matter, it
was not applied to the later territorial acquisitions because, at the time of the
opinion, the country believed that the territories acquired were either advancing
69. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
70. LEIBowrrz, supra note 52, at 11.
71. By resolution of the Congress of Confederation in 1780, the lands then held as territories would be
formed into states and become members of the Union, having the same fights of sovereignty as other states.
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 433 (1857).
72. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 317, 318 (1820). The first case to deal with the power of the United States to
govem territories came in 1810 regarding the territory of Orleans. See Siere v. Pitot, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 332
(1810). Justice Marshall stated that "the power of governing and legislating for a territory is the inevitable
consequence of the fight to acquire and hold territory." Id. at 336.
73. Article I, section 8 of the Constitution grants Congress the power to lay and collect taxes, duties,
imposts, and excises. The Loughborough Court held that the grant was general and therefore applied to all
places over which the government extended. Id. at 318-19.
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to statehood or else had relinquished control to Congress, as had the District of
Columbia.74
B. Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power
Early court rulings held that the right to govern followed the constitutional
grant of power to acquire territory, either through the government's power to
make war or make treaties. 5 The next question to be addressed then is whether
the territories have the same right to protections guaranteed to American citizens
in the Constitution.
The early case of American Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, unlike the
Court in Loughborough, held that because Florida was acquired by an act of
Congress, the rights of the people in the new territory were to be enumerated by
Congress.76 The position of the Court changed again, however, in Dred Scott v.
Sandford.77
Dred Scott v. Sandford is often thought of as one of the most lamentable
cases in American history. In that case, the ostensibly freed slave Dred Scott was
refused citizenship because the Founding Fathers could not have conceived of
extending freedom or citizenship to people of African descent. 8 Such flagrant
racism is shocking to the modern reader and can detract from the less emotional
issue of Congress's authority to govern territory.
74. Id. at 324. This mindset once more typifies the American ideal of a land that stretches from sea to
shining sea in the manner of Manifest Destiny. It is interesting to note that much like the inhabitants of other
United States territories, the residents of the District of Columbia have limited voting rights. It was only with
the passage of the Twenty-third Amendment in 1961 that District of Columbia residents gained the right to
participate in presidential and vice-presidential elections through the appointment of electors. U.S. CONST.
amend. XXIII. Although further amendment of the Constitution was proposed in 1978 to allow District of
Columbia residents to be represented by voting members of Congress, this amendment was not ratified by
thirty-two states within a seven year period; thus, it did not become effective. However, this issue continues to
be of interest. For a discussion of the representation of residents of the District of Columbia, including an
excellent list of bibliographic resources on the subject, see Steve Young, Congressional Representation for the
District of Columbia, LAw LIBRARY LIGHTS, Winter 2004, at 3-4, available at http://www.llsdc.org/
lights/pdf/47_2.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
75. Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton (Canter), 26 U.S. 511, 542 (1828).
76. Id.
77. 60 U.S. 393, 449 (1857).
78. Id. at 406. It is worth taking a moment to recap the facts of the case. Dred Scott was a slave who had
married another slave, Harriet. They had two children who were both bom north of Missouri where there was
no slavery. When the Scotts' "master" sold them to another person, who beat the Scotts and imprisoned them
(which would have been acceptable if they were slaves), the Scotts sued, alleging that they were freed by going
to (or being born in) free states. Rather than looking simply at the issue of the Scotts' status, the Court
considered whether the circuit court of the United States had jurisdiction to hear the case. The Court determined
that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction because Scott, as a slave, could not exercise the rights of a United
States citizen to sue in federal court. Id. at 404, 427.
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C. Dred Scott v. Sanford
Justice Taney first opined that the constitutional provision granting Congress
the power "to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting
the territory or other property belonging to the United States"7 9 is limited in
applicability. The opinion states:
It is the judgment of the court, that.., the power there given, whatever it
may be, is confined, and was intended to be confined, to the territory
which at that time belonged to, or was claimed by, the United States and
was within their boundaries . . . and can have no influence upon a
territory afterward acquired from a foreign Government. It was a special
provision for a known and particular territory, and to meet a present
emergency, and nothing more.80
Justice Taney further argued that congressional power to control the territories is
limited just as its power to govern the states is limited.8' Thus, Congress could
not, constitutionally, by means of the Missouri Compromise, deprive a citizen of
his right to take his property (i.e., slaves) into a territory of the United States.82
Justice Taney stressed the importance of limiting Congress's power to
control the territories to the same degree as to control the states. At the time of
the Dred Scott decision, however, the general understanding that the United
States may only acquire territory to prepare the territory for admittance to the
Union was still dominant83 and, therefore, is not easily applied to those territories
that are unlikely to ever become states.
From these cases and the cases that followed until the late 1800s, it can be
inferred that the Court has ruled in favor of the credo, "the Constitution follows
79. U.S. CONST. art IV, § 3, cl. 2.
80. Scott, 60 U.S. at 432. The purpose of the clause was to transfer to the new United States government
property held in common by the states in order that it could be disposed of and the profits split appropriately so
that all states could deal with their debt. Id. at 433. However, at least one scholar finds it "difficult to take this
passage seriously," stating that general application of such an interpretation "would have made the Constitution
useless long ago." DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS 367-68 (1978).
81. Scott, 60 U.S. at 449. The Court's opinion, as drafted by Taney, stated:
But the power of Congress over the person or property of a citizen can never be a mere discretionary
power under our Constitution and form of government. The powers of the government and the rights
and privileges of the citizen are regulated and plainly defined by the Constitution itself. And when
the Territory becomes a part of the United States, the federal government enters into possession in
the character impressed upon it by those who created it. It enters upon it with its powers over the
citizen strictly defined, and limited by the Constitution .... It has no power of any kind beyond it;
and it cannot, when it enters a territory of the United States, put off its character, and assume
discretionary or despotic powers which the Constitution has denied to it.
Id.
82. Id. at 452.
83. The Scott opinion itself evidences the prevalence of this view. The Court opined that a territory
"must be held and governed in a like manner until it is fitted to be a state." Id. at 449.
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the flag. 84 The Canter decision, discussed above, appears to be an exception,
although not an accidental one. Instead, the Court's rationale for what degree of
power Congress could exercise depended largely on what type of territory was at
issue and how that territory was acquired. In Canter, the territory of Florida was
at issue. Florida was a well-defined territory of Spain before it became a United
States territory and, in the Supreme Court's view, this made it unique from other
territories, like those in the northwest and Missouri.85
Even in the Florida case, however, it is apparent that the Court anticipated
that any territory held by the United States would ultimately become a state,
entitled to all constitutional protections specifically enumerated for the states of
the Union. However, as the "American Empire' 86 expanded beyond the
continental United States to lands occupied by fairly well established populations
with distinct languages and cultures, the previous assumptions of governance in
territories seemed to fade and new doctrines emerged.
Until the end of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court seemed to
consistently hold that the Constitution was in full effect in the territories. This
holding was first shaken in 1890 in Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
v. United States.87 The territory of Utah was acquired by treaty from Mexico. In
an appeal from the territory's Supreme Court, the Court ruled that Congress had
the power to revoke the charter of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints and that the federal government could seize the property incident to the
Church. First, the Court stated that the power to govern the territory was incident
to the power of the government to acquire territory. This was similar to past
rulings on the source of government power in the new territories; however, just
how the Constitution constrains Congress in the new territories is somewhat
unclear in Latter-Day Saints. In what appears to be nothing more than dicta, the
Court stated that constitutional limitations on congressional exercises of power
concerning the territories exist by inference and the "general spirit of the
Constitution from which Congress derives all its powers" and are not an express
8or direct application of any constitutional provision. In the same paragraph, the
Court subjects congressional power to constitutional limitations that are
fundamental in favor of personal rights.89
84. The phrase has been used quite often. See, e.g., Marybeth Herald, Does the Constitution Follow the
Flag into United States Territories or Can it be Separately Purchased and Sold?, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
707 (1995) (discussing the constitutionality of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d
1450 (1992), and how and if the United States Constitution applies to the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands).
85. Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. 542 (1828).
86. Justice Marshall first coined the term "American Empire" in Loughborough v. Blake. 18 U.S. (5
Wheat) 317, 319 (1820).
87. 136 U.S. 1(1890).
88. Id. at 44.
89. Id.
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After suggesting that only fundamental limitations within the Constitution
may apply in the territories, the Court stated that the supreme power of Congress
in the territories is established by the passing of organic acts9° that establish the
governments within the territories and that Congress's legislative power shall be
"consistent" with the Constitution.9' This seems to contradict the previous
statement of the Court in favor of extending only fundamental constitutional
rights to the territories. In Latter-Day Saints, this dichotomy does not weaken the
opinion of the Court because the holding is ultimately that the act of Congress
92
was consistent with the laws of the United States and was constitutional.
Perhaps the Court was unable to predict the result of its words, but the seeds of
change had been planted.
By the late 1800s, the possibility that a territory could be acquired without
advancing to statehood had become a probability. While Justice Marshall had
envisioned territories joining the Union soon after coming under the control of
the United States, a number of new factors had emerged to make that solution
unlikely. Florida, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines had all been acquired
by treaty of cessation from Spain. The territories, with the exception of Florida,
were all relatively small islands with a well-established population of Spanish-
speaking people. While there were some Spanish enclaves in Florida, much of
the territory was uninhabited or inhabited by other non-Spanish peoples, some
native to the area.93 These facts were a very real concern to the Court at that time,
as became apparent in the decisions reached in the turn-of-the-century Insular
Cases.9a These cases made clear that the Supreme Court shared Congress's fear
that incorporating people of distinct racial and cultural backgrounds that differed
from the majority of those in the rest of the United States, may be unacceptable. 9
When the Union was expanding west within the continental United States, it
was perhaps easier to view the rights of citizens of the states as extending to
those western territories that were sparsely populated and ripe for settlement by
Anglos. Perhaps at the turn of the century, the view of the Court reflected a
growing sensitivity to the "Original Sin" against Native American Indians.
Specifically, during the time that Puerto Rico and Guam were acquired, it was no
90. As discussed below, the Organic Acts are very important to United States territories.
91. Latter-Day Saints, 136 U.S. at 44.
92. The Court held that polygamy is forbidden throughout the United States and thus any incorporated
charitable organization (in this instance the Church) that practices and condones polygamy can be
unincorporated by an Act of Congress and their property seized. Id. at 46-48. The Court also stated that, "it was
the intention of Congress that the system of common law and equity which generally prevails in this country
should be operative in the territory of Utah, except as might be altered by legislation." Id. at 62.
93. Nota Bene: Many escaped African slaves did not go to the North, but escaped south to Florida. Many
of them joined with Native Americans and became known as Runaways or Seminoles.
94. The most important of the Insular Cases include Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), which
held that the Revenue Clauses of the Constitution were inapplicable to Puerto Rico as an unincorporated
territory, and De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901), which held that Puerto Rico was not a foreign country and
therefore the import duties levied on sugar were illegal.
95. See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 950 (1991).
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longer acceptable to obliterate native people for the purpose of Anglo settlement.
Despite this recognition, however, there was no sentiment that the natives, absent
naturalization, were entitled to all the same protections guaranteed to Americans
who lived in states.96
The Supreme Court, in its famous decision in Downes v. Bidwell, stated that:
It is obvious that in the annexation of outlying and distant possessions
grave questions will arise from differences of race, habits, laws and
customs of the people, and from differences in soil, climate, and
production, which may require action on the part of Congress that would
be quite unnecessary in the annexation of contiguous territory inhabited
only by people of the same race, or by scattered bodies of Indians. 97
In Downes, the Court was confronted with the question of how the Constitution
applied to the territory of Puerto Rico. Specifically, the issue was whether
territories enjoyed the same protection pursuant to Article I, section 8 of the
Constitution as did the states. This provision of the Constitution, known as the
Uniformity Clause, grants Congress the power to tax, but provides that duties,
imposts, and excises should be consistent throughout the United States.
In the Downes opinion, Justice Brown relied on the specific language of the
Constitution to overturn Loughborough." Justice Brown disagreed with Justice
Marshall's assertion in Loughborough that all of the laws that apply to states also
apply to the District of Columbia and the territories. Justice Brown distinguished
the District of Columbia from other territories by reasoning that since the District
of Columbia was once part of Maryland and Virginia, it had been included in
Congress's Article I powers and thus remained under Congressional power when
it was ceded directly to the federal government. 99 Justice Brown also
distinguished the Dred Scott decision, arguing that the questions presented for
consideration by the Court in the two cases were different. He reasoned that the
96. As early as 1857, in the Scott decision, the Court stated:
[Tihese Indian political communities have always been treated as foreigners not living under our
Government. It is true that the course of events has brought the Indian tribes within the limits of the
United States under subjection to the white race, and it has been found necessary, for their sake as
well as our own, to regard them as in a state of pupilage, and to legislate to a certain extent over
them and the territory they occupy. But they may, without doubt, like the subjects of any other
foreign Government, be naturalized by the authority of Congress, and become citizens of a State, and
of the United States, and if an individual should leave his nation or tribe and take up his abode
among the white population, he would be entitled to all the rights and privileges which would belong
to an emigrant from any other foreign people.
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404 (1857).
97. Bidwell, 182 U.S. at 282.
98. Id. at 261.
99. Interestingly, Justice Brown went so far as to say that Justice Marshall's opinion in Loughborough
had "occasion[ed] some embarrassment in other cases." Id.
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power to prohibit slavery and the power to impose duties upon products are of
such a vastly different nature that they cannot be held to be analogous.' °°
Closely examining the language of the Constitution, Justice Brown argued
that the United States government was created for states alone and that territories
are not a part of the United States.' °' To support his argument, Justice Brown
cited language in Article I that refers to states; he contrasted this language with
the language of the Thirteenth Amendment that explicitly abolished slavery in
the United States and in its territories. He then pointed to the Fourteenth
Amendment, which is silent in regard to territories. 0 2 He reasoned that Congress
must act to extend the Constitution to territories in all but the most fundamental
principles; the Constitution does not extend ex proprio vigore (on its own
strength). 10
3
D. Downes, Incorporation, and the Constitution
Justice White, in his concurring opinion, also gave Congress broad powers in
extending the Constitution to the territories. His approach, however, was
decidedly different. In what appears to be a judicial attempt to create greater
congressional control over Puerto Rico, the Downes concurrence creates the
concept of "incorporation" that is still in existence today.' °4 In White's view,
Congress must extend the protections of the Constitution to their full extent to
incorporated territories. Congress has greater power to decide how the
Constitution applies to a territory that is unincorporated.
Justice White's approach was a recharacterization of the issue. White
questioned at what point a territory is incorporated into the United States and
whether that determination is a congressional one. Downes addressed whether
Puerto Rico had been incorporated into the United States at the time Congress
passed the act of cession from Spain. The Court was effective in establishing
what has become a basic tenet of incorporation, in that the incorporated or
unincorporated status of a territory is largely determined at the time of its
acquisition rather than by attitudes taking effect after the territory has passed
from one government to another. The Court determined that Puerto Rico had not
been incorporated at the time that Congress passed the act under which the
United States acquired Puerto Rico as a territory.' 5 Therefore, because Congress
100. Id. at 271-74.
101. See Neuman, supra note 95, at 909, 960 (discussing Justice Brown's reliance on the "state
membership" approach).
102. Downes, 182 U.S at 251.
103. Justice Brown's opinion states: "The liberality of Congress in legislating the Constitution into all
our contiguous territories has undoubtedly fostered the impression that it went there by its own force, but there
is nothing in the Constitution itself, and little in the interpretation put upon it, to confirm that impression." Id. at
286.
104. Id. at 299 (White, J., concurring).
105. Id. at 248 (majority opinion).
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acquired the territory under its powers to make treaties and wars, and these
powers were extended to include the power to govern the acquisitions, Congress
had greater control in regulating the territories. The Court went on to say that the
treaty making powers of the United States stopped short of incorporation;
therefore, the act of incorporation must be a separate act of Congress.'06 The final
conclusion of the White concurrence was that, until Congress acts to incorporate
a territory, it remains unincorporated and subject to broad congressional
control. 1°7
There are some limits to Congress's power to govern territories, which are
recognized by Justice Brown and the concurring Justices. 0 8 The distinction is
made between "fundamental" constitutional rights, such as the protection of life,
liberty, and property, and "remedial" rights, such as rights to citizenship and
suffrage. 0 9 Brown acknowledged that distinguishing between these types of
rights may cause some difficulty; however, it accomplishes the tasks of
delegating these decisions to a congressional exercise of what he termed "certain
principles of natural justice inherent in the Anglo-Saxon character .... ""o
Obviously, this solution was of little consolation to those Americans and
inhabitants of territories who were not Anglo-Saxon.
The Court in Downes justified this broad power of incorporation in two
different ways. The first justification was that incorporation can act as a means of
protecting the United States' interests. One hypothetical the Court offered
supposed that if a territory were invaded and occupied through a just war, there
would be much danger inherent in incorporating a territory that was hostile to the
United States."' Similarly, if the territory were to be incorporated immediately,
the United States would abandon all hope of recouping losses suffered."
2
The second justification offered was of the most benefit to citizens of the
territories. The Court distinguished territories that were sparsely settled and ripe
for settlement by white citizens of European origin from those that had
established populations with unique languages and races. Justice Brown wrote
that, in some cases, the cultural barriers may be too great for the United States to
106. Id. at 280.
107. Id. at 319 (White, J., concurring).
108. Id.
109. The Downes Court equated the status of the people living in unincorporated territories with that of
Chinese people living in the United States because Chinese people were not citizens but were afforded
constitutional guarantees regarding life, liberty, and property. Id. at 283. See, e.g., Lem Moon Sing v. United
States, 158 U.S. 538 (1895); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886).
110. More recent Supreme Court cases have done little to shed light on how to define a "fundamental"
right apart from Anglo-Saxon bias. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), for example, the
concurring Justices stated that in determining which rights were fundamental, judges must look to the traditions
and collective conscience of our people to determine if the right is fundamental. Id. at 493. This of course begs
the question: Who are our people?
111. Downes, 182 U.S. at 308.
112. Id.
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overcome and that some rights may be restricted for a time. Like many Justices
before him, he retained the belief that ideally a territory would become a state, as
evidenced by his statement that "the question at once arises whether large
concessions ought not to be made for a time, that ultimately our own theories
may be carried out, and the blessings of free government under the Constitution
extended to them."' 13
Downes justifications have been applied in later cases as well. In 1922, for
example, in Balzac v. Porto Rico, the Court compared the difference in relative
population between Alaska and Puerto Rico. On the one hand, the Court noted
that the sparsely populated lands in Alaska were ripe for settlement and the
settlers, who presumably would come from other states, would be amiable to the
full force of the Constitution. On the other hand, Puerto Rico was recognized as a
well-established, well-populated land and, because of these factors, would
present difficulties in incorporation."'
In creating the doctrine of incorporation, the Supreme Court extended
Congress's unilateral powers over territories acquired by treaty and by conquest
beyond those that are evident from the face of the Constitution. The Insular
Cases"5 have confirmed the doctrine, which was used not only in questions
regarding Alaska and Puerto Rico, but also Hawaii, the Philippines, and even
1990s cases involving the Northern Mariana Islands. ' 6 Another important case
involving incorporation came from the United States Virgin Islands and held that
once incorporated, the citizens of a United States territory enjoy the protections
of the United States Constitution and the Bill of Rights."7
113. Id. at 287.
114. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922).
115. See Efren Rivera Ramos, The Legal Construction of American Colonialism: The Insular Cases
(1901-1922), 65 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 225 (1996) (providing a detailed discussion of the Insular cases). As Ramos
points out, the term "normally" refers to a series of nine decisions issued in 1901. However, other decisions that
were rendered after 1901 may be categorized as Insular Cases. Id. at 240. Additionally, some scholars limit the
number of Insular Cases to six: De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221
(1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901);
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); and Huus v. N.Y. & Porto Rico Steamship Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901).
Lisa Napoli, The Legal Recognition of the National Identity of a Colonized People: The Case of Puerto Rico, 18
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 159, 171 n.46 (1998). "As formulated finally by the Court, the issues in the Insular
Cases could be summarized in the following questions: What was the status of the new territories? How much
power did Congress enjoy in their governance? And what were the rights of their inhabitants?" Id. at 242.
Justice White, in his concurring opinion in one of the Insular Cases, Downes v. Bidell, is credited with first
espousing the incorporation doctrine. Ramos, supra at 247.
116. See, e.g., Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903);
Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1992). These are only a handful of the incorporation cases
following the Downes opinion, but they do reflect the geographic variety and timespan of the other cases.
117. Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1, 5 (1995).
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In an opinion that nearly mirrors the one in Downes, the Court ruled that only
"fundamental" parts of the Constitution were in full effect in Hawaii until an act
of incorporation was passed by Congress' 's even though the resolution that
annexed the territory clearly stated:
The municipal legislation of the Hawaiian Islands, not enacted for the
fulfillment of the treaties so extinguished, and not inconsistent with this
joint resolution nor contrary to the Constitution of the United States...
shall remain in force until the Congress of the United States shall
otherwise determine.' 9
The resolution left provisions of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments previously in
place to remain in effect, apart from what the Court considered "fundamental"
Constitutional rights that would automatically extend to territories and allowing
the municipal legislation. 2°
E. The Organic Acts
Once a territory is admitted to the Union as a state, it is governed by the
United States Constitution. States have the power of self-governance and are
sovereign. Citizens of the several states may also elect representatives in the
federal government. Unincorporated territories, however, have no power of self-
governance. Congress has the power to govern the people and the territories,
though the people have no right to participate in politics."' However, Congress
may grant territories the authority to govern themselves locally. 22 In such cases,
local government is established through organic law.
Organic law is legislation enacted by Congress that gives territories the
power of local self-government, subject only to Congress's power to enact,
repeal, or amend laws that local territorial legislatures enact. The organic act of a
territory defines the boundaries of its scope, just as the Constitution defines the
scope of the federal govermnent in relation to states. In Guam, for example, the
118. Mankichi, 190 U.S. at 217-18.
119. Joint Resolution to Provide for Annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States, 30 Stat. 750-
751 (1898).
120. Mankichi, 190 U.S. at 217-18. In Mankichi, the Supreme Court found that the manslaughter
conviction of a defendant who was not indicted by a grand jury and convicted by only nine of twelve jurors, as
was lawful in the Republic of Hawaii, was valid even though not in compliance with the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments. Id.
121. Dorr, 195 U.S. at 148.
122. See Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 168 (1899) (holding that Congress has the power to delegate
legislative authority to a territory).
123. Bordenelli v. United States, 233 F.2d 120, 122 (9th Cir. 1956).
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organic act enacted by Congress in 1950 serves in place of a Constitution.
Congress also granted citizen status to the people of Guam in an organic act. 24
The enactment of organic law in a territory does not, however, abrogate
congressional control over the territories. In fact, even after the enactment of
organic law, Congress maintains full and complete legislative authority over the
people of the territories, including the right to validate or void any act passed by
the local government or implement any law it sees fit without the consent of the
territory.' 25 As a result, the passage of organic acts does not ensure that the
citizens of a territory have a full measure of self-government, unless that territory
becomes incorporated or a state.
Another kind of territorial status, commonwealth status, has emerged as one
that extends greater autonomy to territorial people under the control of the United
States. Two United States territories, Puerto Rico and the Northern Mariana
Islands, have been part of the territorial movement toward autonomy via
commonwealth status. In these territories, as a concession to their status,
Congress ceded some of its broad powers. This cessation has been cause for
concern.
V. WHO WANTS TO BE A COMMONWEALTH?
Some territories will likely never become states. The reasons vary. For
example, the United States may rationalize that the territories would not "fit"
well within the United States. Alternatively, the territories may believe that
incorporation into the United States would be detrimental to their own sense of
identity. Statehood may not be the answer for all of these nations, but they may
want to be associated with the United States and the protection that the United
States can offer-not only from other countries but, using constitutional
protections, also from their own governments. Remember that all of the
"fundamental" rights follow the American flag-whatever the status of the
territory.
The term "commonwealth" is not easily defined.'26 Indeed, that subject itself
is enough to be the subject of another lengthy article. There is clearly an
indication that commonwealth status indicates a bilateral relationship between
the United States and the territory. For example, Puerto Rico became a
commonwealth pursuant to a 1950 compact between Puerto Rico and the United
States. Puerto Rico is free to enact its own laws and follow its own constitution,
124. Agana Bay Dev. Co. v. Sup. Ct. of Guam, 529 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1976).
125. Nat'l Bank v. Yankton, 101 U.S. 129, 133 (1880).
126. OFFICE OF INSULAR AFFAIRS, supra note 38, defines it as follows:
The term "Commonwealth" does not describe or provide any specific political status or
relationship. It has, for example, been applied to both states and territories. When used in
connection with areas under United States sovereignty that are not states, the term broadly
describes an area that is self-governing under a constitution of its adoption and whose right of
self-government will not be unilaterally withdrawn by Congress.
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as long as those terms do not violate the United States Constitution or the
compact. The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands was formed as a
result of the covenant reached between the United States and the Northern
Mariana Islands. The Philippines were a commonwealth prior to gaining
independence in 1946. '27
A. What About Statehood?
Although they are commonwealths, the current United States flag islands are
not incorporated. Today, a territory is considered to be incorporated if it was
intended to be admitted to the Union as a state from the time it was acquired."'
Apart from a reluctance to lose their senses of identity separate and apart
from the United States, there are two main trade-offs between becoming states
and maintaining the status quo, from the perspective of the islands. These are, in
the true American fashion, taxation and representation.
The commonwealths do not pay income tax to the United States federal
government. They are free to collect their own income tax and do. In this way,
they are better able to govern themselves by deciding, for example, how much
Puerto Rico should tax and how much it should spend. The United States
probably also prefers that Puerto Rico retain its independent tax status because,
as a state, the costs of providing all federal services to Puerto Rico could be up to
three billion dollars. Given that the per capita income of the average Puerto Rican
is just over six thousand dollars, it may be that the two economic systems are too
far apart to be of a benefit to the United States, and additional income tax can be
of little benefit to a modest economic system like that in Puerto Rico. 9
This benefit does not come free. In Hawaii v. Mankichi, the Court ruled that
only the fundamental parts of the Constitution were extended to unincorporated
territories. For citizens of the territories, this may be just fine. After all, if the
fundamental rights are protected, then it is not unfeasible that the territory is
perfectly capable of finding its own means of enforcing laws that protect those
fundamental rights.3
127. Jon M. Van Dyke, The Evolving Legal Relationships Between the United States and Its Affiliated
U.S.-Flag Islands, 14 U. HAW. L. REV. 445, 451 (1992).
128. Northern Mariana Islands v. Atilig, 723 F.2d 682, 688 (9th Cir. 1984).
129. ROBERT POSADA, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, EXECUTIVE MEMORANDUM #495, CAUTION
NEEDED ON PUERTO RICO STATEHOOD: THE COSTLY, CONFUSING AND CONTENTIOUS REPERCUSSIONS OF H.R.
856 (1992), available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/EM495.cfm (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review). These figures are quite old, but aside from inflation, little of significance has changed
that would lead this author to believe the numbers are misleading as to the proportionate nature of the costs.
130. 190 U.S. 197 (1903). In this case, the United States Supreme Court found the manslaughter
conviction of a defendant who was not indicted by a grand jury and convicted by only nine of twelve jurors
(which was legal in the territory of Hawaii) was valid, even though it was not in compliance with the Fifth and
Sixth amendments. Id. at 217-18.
131. Id.
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B. Why Would the United States Acquire More Territory?
Given the current issues facing the United States regarding international
terrorism and security, the United States is probably not going to acquire any
more territory in the near future.32 With different levels of willingness to
cooperate, the United States has access, albeit not exclusive access, to many
military bases all over the world. Even nations that may not be entirely
sympathetic to the United States will allow a certain level of United States
involvement on their soil to avoid open hostility or, worse yet, embargoes. It is
preferable to work within a system that is known to the United States than it is to
work in a new one. For example, if the United States were to attempt to acquire
an island base nearer to the Middle East for the purposes of monitoring military
activity with rapid naval and air response times, the risk of a negative reaction
from the rest of the world may be more than the United States can endure in
terms of public relations. Along the same lines, if there is no established order
within the country, it may be difficult to tell which inhabitants are sympathetic to
the United States and which are not. This is particularly true in situations where
inhabitants consider themselves more closely affiliated with a Mediterranean,
Muslim, or Arab group than a European or Anglo group, with which the world
most closely links the United States. Again, race and ethnicity are likely to enter
the picture.
With that in mind, the only reason the United States might want to acquire
more territory lies in facts similar to those in the Guano islands. It is more likely
in 2007, that people will be in search of cheaper, lighter, cleaner fuel rather than
fertilizer, but it is this type of "goldmine" that could prompt the United States to
acquire more territory.133 Americans have been looking for a way to decrease
their dependence on foreign oil, and an acquisition may be the best way to go
about it. It appears that drilling in Alaska may also further postpone that
rationale. 1
34
132. U.S. Dep't of State, Current Issues: Terrorism, http://www.usembassy.org.uk/terror.html (last
visited May 6, 2007) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (providing an excellent sample of current events
outlining issues facing the United States). For example, the recent release of detainees previously suspected of
terrorist activities, the continued involvement of the United States in Iraq to support the drafting of a
Constitution, and the popular reaction to approval of the extension of hotly debated provisions of the Patriot Act
are all issues requiring continued governmental attention.
133. Justin Gillis & Dina Elboghdady, Supply Uncertainty Propels Gas Prices, WASH. POST, Sept. 4,
2005, at A29 (noting that gas prices in some areas had risen to six dollars per gallon). This is but one example
of the many news stories regarding rising oil and gas prices. Further, acquisition of territory and utilization of
the territory's natural resources, specifically petroleum resources, would not be an unprecedented act in United
States history. In the late nineteenth century, with the discovery of oil, white culture intruded on Native
American land and made full use of the oil resources located on the land. See TERRY P. WILSON, THE
UNDERGROUND RESERVATION ix (1985) ("[B]ecause of the presence of petroleum ... the [white] intruders
were especially numerous and included many who ruthlessly sought to separate the tribe from its wealth by any
means possible.").
134. Robin Kundis Craig, The Bush Administration and the Environment: An Overview, 25 N. ENG. L.
REV. 1, 10 (1990-1991).
539
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C. The United Nations and Other International Law Obligations
Free association should be the result of a free and voluntary choice by
the peoples of the territory concerned expressed through informed and
democratic processes. 135
Globalization has led to an increase in the entire world's participation in
areas that historically may have been viewed as sovereign affairs. In the case of
acquisition of territory, the United Nations has been particularly involved in
creating an international voice for territories across the world that have been
without voices for so long.
136
1. The United Nations Mandate for Self-Determination
According to the Charter of the United Nations, members must assume
responsibility for the administration of non-self-governing territories. 37 The
members also must regularly submit statistical information relating to the social,
economic, and educational conditions of those territories. 3 s The member nations
are obligated "to develop self-government in territories, to take due account of
the political aspirations of the peoples in the territories, and to assist them in the
progressive development of their free political institutions.' 39
The United Nations General Assembly enacted several resolutions to guide
the member nations in preparing a territory for self-government. Resolution 648,
for example, defines three separate paths to self-government. They are 1)
independence, 2) other separate systems of self-government, and 3) free
association. ' °0
While the second category, or "other" provision, has not been more
adequately defined, Resolution 742 has shed light on factors helpful in
135. G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), 15 U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp., No. 16, at 29, UN Doe A/4651 (Dec. 16,
1960).
136. In 1960, the United Nations passed the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples. GA Res. 1514 (XV), para. 4, UN GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, 67, UN Doc.
A/4684 (1960) This document set the tone the international community was to take and emphasized that people
should not be subjugated by those alien to their land. By 1994, the United Nations Security Council was able to
terminate the Trusteeship Agreement for the last of the original eleven territories that it had overseen because
all had become autonomous, independent, or voluntarily affiliated. Department of Public Information, U.N.
Trusteeship Council, http://www.un.org/documents/tc.htm (last visited June 6, 2007) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
137. U.N. Charter art. 73.
138. Dorian A. Shaw, The Status of Puerto Rico Revisited: Does the Current U.S.-Puerto Rico
Relationship Uphold International Law?, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1006, 1025 (1994).
139. Id. at 1025.
140. Id. (citing G.A. Res. 648, U.N. GAOR, 7th Sess., Supp. No. 20 at 34, U.N. Doc. A/2361 (Dec. 10,
1952)). These terms are very vague, possibly as a way to allow the United Nations to keep the larger nations in
check. Perhaps this grants the United Nations some leeway to regulate, regardless of what the member nation
claims. In the alternative, maybe the vagueness renders this provision useless.
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determining if a territory has attained self-government through free association or
other separate systems. These factors are divided into three categories titled
general, international status, and internal self-government.'4' In the category of
general factors, one of the primary factors listed is whether the population of the
territory that has voluntarily limited its sovereignty may "modify at any time this
status through the expression of their will by democratic means.' ' 2 Under the
category of international status, one of the listed considerations is the "extent to
which the Territory exercises the power to enter freely into direct relations of
every kind with other governments.' 43 The internal self-government category
includes factors that judge the amount of interference with the legislative,
executive, and judicial functions of the government.' 44 Some factors include:
(i) whether constitutional guarantees extend equally to the associated
territory; (ii) whether there are powers that are constitutionally reserved
to the territory or to the central authority; and (iii) whether there is a
provision for the equal participation of the territory in any changes in the
constitutional system of the State. Resolution 742 further noted that
citizenship should be provided without discrimination on the same basis
as other inhabitants of the central authority. Finally, Resolution 742
stated that the territory should be free to modify its associated status
through the expression of the associated will of the people by democratic
145
means.
It is unclear whether the United States has acted in accordance with the
United Nations resolutions. While several territories have advanced to the level
of "commonwealth," and have rights they had not possessed before now, the
question of whether their status is in fact modifiable through the will of the
people or if that is mere legal fiction intended to placate the United Nations, is a
legitimate question. For example, the covenant between Northern Mariana and
the United States has been the "high-water mark" of territorial provisions. The
covenant guarantees the Northern Mariana Islands the right of local self-
government and provides that the right to self-government cannot be modified
unilaterally by the United States. Rather, any modification must be consented to
by the government of the Northern Mariana Islands. However, as noted by one
author, "the extent of that right.., has been the subject of much debate and some
litigation.' 46 Further, under the provisions of the covenant, United States
141. G.A. Res. 742, U.N. GAOR, 8th Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc A/2630 (Nov. 27, 1953).
142. Id. at 22.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 22-23.
145. Shaw, supra note 138, at 1026.
146. Daniel H. Macmeekin, The Overseas Territories and Commonwealths of the United States of
America, http://www.macmeekin.com/Library/terr+commonw2.htm (last visited June 6, 2007) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review). It should be noted at the time of the writing, Mr. Macmeekin was representing the
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approval is required if the Mariana residents determine that it is in their interest
to become independent "by democratic means and through constitutional
processes . 47
2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Political Rights
In addition to the concerns raised by the self-determination provisions of the
Charter of the United Nations, the relationships between the United States and its
"territories" also call into question the human rights obligations of the United
States. The United States is a signatory of both the United Nations' covenants on
Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.'4'8 Both of
these documents contain identical provisions requiring signatories to respect the
rights of all peoples to dispose of their natural resources and to ensure "that a
people [not] be deprived of its own means of subsistence."'' 49 Once again, the
United States relationship with the Northem Mariana Islands may call into
question the commitment of the United States to these provisions.
On February 24, 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit issued an opinion in an action brought against the United States by the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands to quiet title to the submerged
lands adjacent to the Commonwealth. 5 Applying the paramountcy doctrine, 5'
the Court stated that "[a]bsent express indication to the contrary, the ownership
of seaward submerged lands accompanies United States sovereignty. The
Covenant lacks such an expression."'52 As has been noted by others, islanders are
surrounded by the ocean and often depend on it for their livelihood.'53 The issue
is then whether the holding in the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands
cases indicates that the United States is interfering with the rights of the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana in litigation against the United States. As such, it is likely that his
views were influenced by this representation.
147. Clark, supra note 46, at 75-76.
148. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st
Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 53, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
149. See supra note 148.
150. Northern Mariana Islands v. United States, 399 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2005).
151. The paramountcy doctrine was expressed in the cases of United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19
(1947), and United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950). Through broad language, the Court held that the
federal government must have the "paramount power" to regulate the seabed and ocean to allow the federal
government to fulfill its defense and commerce regulation responsibilities. For an in-depth discussion of the
paramountcy doctrine as well as the discovery doctrine, discussed in this article, see generally Andrew P.
Richards, Aboriginal Title or the Paramountcy Doctrine? Johnson v. McIntosh Flounders in Federal Waters
Off Alaska in Native Village of Eyak v. Trawler Diane Marie, Inc., 78 WASH. L. REV. 939 (2003).
152. Northern Mariana Islands, 399 F.3d at 1064.
153. Clark, supra note 46, at 75-76.
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 38
Commonwealth's residents to dispose of their natural resources and to use these
natural resources as a means of subsistence.
V1. CONCLUSION
As nations break into smaller nations or restructure themselves, they may
find that to protect their natural resources or unite cultural groups of people, lines
between nations need to be redrawn.'54 Furthermore, gaps between the assets of
rich nations and poor nations may lead to agreements between the poorer nations
to form a connection that may be less than an acquisition, but more than a mere
alliance. The success or failure of the European Union may be the guiding
beacon in whether more developments like it ensue.
As far as the United States is concerned, there are a substantial number of
reasons that the modern day citizen should be concerned with the problems of
acquisition of territory. The questions outlined in this article include issues of
constitutionality and our collective morality.'55 Our Founding Fathers believed
that America did not possess the right to take over a territory with no intention
that it should ever become a state, but today the United States possesses several
territories that remain unincorporated. The federal government of the United
States has extended citizenship to the people in some territories 1 6 and has granted
the inhabitants of all territories the right to protection from their own
governments under the Fourteenth Amendment.'5 7 Although courts have
continued to hold that only "fundamental" constitutional rights are guaranteed to
154. Nations that have experienced difficulties because of the diverse cultural and ethnic populations
included within a single nation include Yugoslavia, Canada, Belgium, India, and numerous African nations
formed along colonial boundaries that ignored travel routes and language differences. China also has
experienced difficulties because of its diverse population. See Randall Peerenboom, Assessing Human Rights in
China: Why the Double Standard?, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 71, 134 (2005) (discussing the ethnic diversity in
China). Additionally, the formation of the government of Iraq evidences the difficulties that inclusion of multi-
cultural groups into one large nation may cause. Contra Paul A. Clark, Taking Self-determination Seriously:
When Can Cultural and Political Minorities Control Their Own Fate, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 737, 746 (2005) (citing
incidents in Turkey and the Soviet Union, and the historic struggle between the British and the Irish, the author
suggests that permitting self-determination based on ethnic, religious, or cultural difference might increase the
incidence of ethnic and religious "cleansing").
155. Ask anyone on the street if they believe the United States should be in the business of
"colonization."
156. The people of Puerto Rico and Guam are United States citizens, as are United States Virgin
Islanders. People in American Samoa are United States nationals, but not citizens. FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL,
supra note 34, at 7 app. A4.
157. Sagana v. Tenorio, 384 F.3d 731, 740 (9th Cir. 2004). This case held that the Fourteenth
Amendment applies to the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands as if it were one of the several
states. Although this decision noted that the decision involved the covenant between the United Stated and the
Northern Mariana Islands, the Commonwealth is bound by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Rayphand v. Sablan, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1139 (D. N. Mar. 1. 1999); Puerto Rico Pub. Hous.
Admin. v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 59 F. Supp. 2d 310 (D.P.R. 1999). The case held that even
though Puerto Rico is not a state, it is bound by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
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inhabitants of unincorporated territories,' 8 at least the rights to religious freedom,
freedom of speech, and due process are preserved. 59
It is therefore evident that the United States finds itself in a position that is
difficult to reconcile with agreements made with the territories and the United
Nations. There must be a better justification for the continued practice of
"appeasing" the inhabitants of United States territories with rights granted a few
at a time, when they should in fact either become states or else break with the
United States and become independent, or reach an agreement in which self-
government is truly accomplished but association provides benefits for both
parties. This approach would likely help the United States be perceived as a more
responsible player in the global arena. While the United States may maintain a
self-image that it is the well-intentioned "policeman of the world," this
perception is not necessarily shared by other nations.' 60 Similarly, from the
viewpoint of the global community, an approach that provides for self-
governance of territories would help combat the perception that the United States
continues to be interested in pursuing "colonization." Even when allowing
territories to become states or to achieve self-governance, however, can the
United States acquire a territory? Perhaps that question remains.
158. Rayphand v. Sablan, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1133 (1999).
159. Lisa M. Kornives, Enfranchising a Discrete and Insular Minority: Extending Federal Voting Rights
to American Citizens Living in United States Territories, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 115, 119. (2004)
(discussing what rights are fundamental to citizens of the several states and how those differ from what is
fundamental to a citizen of a territory). Can voting really not be a fundamental part of being a United States
citizen?
160. See Doug Bandow, A Foreign Policy for a Republic, Not an Empire, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 353
(1999).
